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I. Introduction
Reformers have reshaped the theory of sentencing in the United
States during the last decade,' responding to the realization that reha-
bilitation as a primary goal of sentencing is not realistic.' Prior to the
1970s, rehabilitation was seen as the ultimate aim of the penal system.
Rehabilitation involves the use of sentencing to isolate and reform of-
fenders, thereby reducing crime.3 But "correctional institutions" did
not rehabilitate, and the rehabilitation goal began to lose favor among
commentators around 1970.5 Extremely overcrowded surroundings,
brutality, intra-inmate violence, filthy conditions, lack of medical atten-
tion, and negative psychological effects from long term incarceration
are among the reasons for prisons' failure to rehabilitate.6
1. A. SUNDBERG, A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE. STATEWIDE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW (1982); See generally AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); W. RICH, C. SUTTON, T.
CLEAR, M. SAKS, SENTENCING BY MATHEMATICS: AN EVALUATION OF THE EARLY AT-
TEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES xvii (1982); C. SIL-
BERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 502-74 (1978); R. SINGER, JUST
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979); A. VON HIRSCH, DO-
ING JUSTICE (1976); G. CAVENDER, The Philosophical Justifications of Deteriminate
Sentencing, 26 AM J. JURIS. 157 (1981); and Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing
Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Excessive Punishment Before and After Rum-
mel v. Estelle, DUKE L. J. 1103 (1980).
2. N. KITTRIE and E. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 49-
54 (1981); Greenberg and Humphries, The Cooptation of Fixed Sentencing Reform,
CRIME & DELING., April 1980, at 206 [hereinafter cited as Greenberg].
3. Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment:
Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, DUKE L. J. 1103,
1199(1980).
4. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 1, at 504. Silberman quotes the 1967 Crime Com-
mission: "Indeed, experts are increasingly coming to feel that the conditions under
which many offenders are handled, particularly in institutions, are often a positive det-
riment to rehabilitation." Id.
5. See Gardner, supra note 3, at 1103, Greenberg, supra note 2, at 207 and R.
SINGER, supra note 1, at 1-10.
6. Crump, Determinate Sentencing: The Promises and Perils of Sentence Guide-
lines, 68 KY. L.J. 1, 28-33 (1977-80). C. SILBERMAN, supra note 1, at 502-74.
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Prisoner unrest caused by blatant disparity in sentencing addition-
ally contributed to the need for reform. Criminals with similar records
who commited the same crime received greatly varied sentences.'
Moreover, uncertain sanctions created a sense of anxiety in the prison-
ers. "[I]t becomes increasingly apparent that the very indeterminacy of
indeterminate sentences is a form of psychological torture." 8 The reha-
bilitative model utilized an indeterminate sentencing system in sentenc-
ing the offender, where the parole board controlled an inmate's future
by determining his release date based on his behavior. Under this sys-
tem, the sentences necessarily covered a broad period of time. For ex-
ample, a typical indeterminate sentence would be five to twenty years.
Given this latitude, the parole board could select the 'magic moment'
when a criminal [was] rehabilitated." 9 However, the task of ascertain-
ing that moment, if that moment ever occured at all, was almost impos-
sible.10 The Federal Parole Commission frankly admits that accurately
selecting the critical moment when a prisoner is ready for release is
beyond their capabilities."
The rehabilitative system somehow allowed the "inequalities of
wealth and power"' 2 to determine sentences more than the defendant's
blameworthiness or the moral turpitude of the crime itself.13 The crimi-
nal justice system's over-optimistic rehabilitative ambitions resulted
from and was perpetuated, in part, by sentencing uncertainty and dis-
parity. Since there are financial obstacles and practical complications
inherent in revising the penal system toward effective rehabilitation,
legislators and judicial officials opted to alleviate one aspect of the
problem by restructuring sentencing procedures and policies. A shift
from a rehabilitative philosophy to one of "just deserts"' 4 resulted. Just
7. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1. at 72-74; Greenberg, supra note 2, at 208.
8. Alshuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent
Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 UL. PA. L. REV. 550, 553
(1978). See also Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Parole Release Guidelines, 51 U.
COLO. L. REV. 237,237 (1980); GARDNER, supra note 3, at 1109; and von Hirsch,
Constructing Guidelines for Sentencing: The Critical Choices for the Minnesota
Guidelines Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164. 176-77 (1982).
9. Alschuler, supra note 8, at U. COLO. L. REV. at 238.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 208.
13. Id.
14. Wilkins, Sentence Guidelines to Reduce Disparity?, CRiM.L. REV. 201, 205
(1980).
[Vol. 8
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deserts, or retribution, as a purpose for sentencing entails the theory
that the offender has violated "societal rules and must be 'punished" in
order that he or she receives just deserts.""a
The Florida Sentencing Guidelines are based on this philosophy.16
The guidelines 17 took effect on October 1, 1983. The greatest change
from the old system of sentencing was the seemingly shorter sentence
lengths. This reduction resulted from the abolition of parole release,
and the imposition of sentences decreased only by gain time.18 Rather
than lengthy sentences determined by a judge and subject later to the
Parole Commission's discretion, a felon's "composite score"19 is calcu-
lated, based on the offenses at conviction, prior record, legal status at
the time of the offense and extent of victim injury, where pertinent.20
This score determines a narrow range of "presumptive sentences" 21
which are "assumed appropriate" 22 for the offender. Provision is made
for departure from the guidelines at the judge's discretion, but such
departures require written explanation.23 The guideline sentences apply
to all felonies, excluding capital offenses and those with mandatory
sentences, committed after October 1, 1983 .24 Felons sentenced after
that date whose crimes were committed prior to it, may affirmatively
choose to have the guideline sentence imposed.25
This note summarizes and critiques the philosophy and formula-
tion of the Florida Sentencing Guidelines, their strengths and some po-
tential problems. It analyzes circumstances under which departures
from the presumptive sentences are allowed. It addresses the question
of the Guidelines' constitutionality, raising and predicting the probable
outcome of various challenges. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
served in part as a prototype for Florida's Guidelines.26 Because of the
15. N. KITTRIE and E. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS -
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 14 (1980).
16. In re Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines), 439 So. 2d 848
(Fla. 1983).
17. FLA. R. CRIM. P.. 3.701 and form 3.988.
18. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(5).
19. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(8).
20. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.988(a)(i).
21. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(8).
22. Id.
23. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 370.1(b)(6) and (d)(11).
24. Sentencing Guidelines, 439 So. 2d 848.
25. Id.
26. The motivation for the final stages of the construction of the Florida Sentenc-
ing Guidelines was described by Robert Wesley, Staff Counsel for the Florida Sentenc-
1984]
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similarities between the two, this note will present a survey of the cases
interpreting that state's guidelines, so as to aid in understanding the
effects these new Florida guidelines will have.
II. Development of the Guidelines
A. Early Interest
Florida's sentencing reform began in January of 1978 when the
Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court appointed a committee "to
examine the extent and causes of sentence disparity and to explore the
variety of sentence alternatives available-judicial, legislative, and ad-
ministrative-to reduce unreasonable sentence variation."2 This sen-
tencing committee consisted of judges, professors and legislators, to en-
sure a thorough examination of the repercussions of change in the
criminal justice system.28
The primary goal of the committee was "to devise a system where
individuals of similar backgrounds would receive roughly equivalent
sentences when they commit similar crimes, regardless of the different
penal philosophies of legislators, correctional authorities, parole author-
ities, or judges." '29 The committee examined the various reforms emerg-
ing in the country and the felony sentencing practices in use in the
state.30 In its Interim Report, 1 the committee recommended,
in principle, the exercise of judicial discretion in the sentencing
process. However, in order to achieve a greater degree of consis-
ing Guidelines Commission, as coming from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
These guidelines bear many similarities to the completed Florida guidelines. See gener-
ally von Hirsch, supra note 8, for a complete description and analysis of the Minnesota
Guidelines.
27. Sundberg, Plante and Palmer, A Proposal for Sentence Reform in Florida, 8
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1980). This reform was spurred by the current reform in
the United States in general and by several sources specifically. Among these specific
influences was L WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTTFREDSON, J. CALPIN and A. GELMAN,
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, REPORT TO THE FEA-
SIBILITY STUDY (1976) cited in A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 42 n.l.
28. Sundberg, Plante & Palmer, supra note 27, at 2, 3.
29. Id. at 3.
30. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 3.
31. Id. at 4, 44 & n. 12, citing Interim Report of the Sentencing Study Commit-
tee to the Florida Supreme Court (1978) (available from the Office of the State Courts
Administrator at the Florida Supreme Court).
690 [Vol. 8
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tency and fairness in the sentencing process throughout the state,
the committee recomend[ed] the development of structured sen-
tencing guidelines in combination with a sentencing review panel
that would operate within the sentence parameters prescribed by
the Legislature.32
B. Multijurisdictional Sentencing Guidelines Project
In 1974, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice33 (NIJ) and the Law Enforcement Asistance Administration
(LEAA) funded a study to determine the feasibility of drafting and
utilizing sentencing guidelines. 34 The resulting study encouraged an ex-
tension of the project on a multijurisdictional level. Four years later,
Florida became part of the project.3 5 Four Florida judicial circuits were
specifically selected as sites for the pilot program. The specific circuits
were chosen for several reasons, including: 1) the availability and com-
32. Id. Sentencing guidelines are inherently different from other forms of sen-
tencing reform. States such as California, Maine, Illinois, and Indiana now use "deter-
minate sentencing" schemes, which involve little or no judicial discretion. There are
three basic types of determinate sentencing schemes: mandatory or minimum-
mandatory sentencing, flat time sentencing, and presumptive sentencing. Guidelines are
most similar to the presumptive model (though often the distinctions between all cate-
gories are blurred), in that the trial judge has a limited range of sentences from which
to select, and aggravating or mitigating factors can vary the range. The difference be-
tween the to lies in the greater amount of discretion the judge has under sentencing
guidelines. Whereas a presumptive system merely provides a judge with a new pre-
sumption in the presence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the guidelines
allow a judge total freedom in administering the sentence, once he determines that such
a circumstance exists. The judge using guidelines may also deviate for reasons relating
to the defendant, rather than only to the offense itself, as he would be restricted under
most presumptive systems. This greater amount of discretion can be viewed as either
good or bad, depending upon one's confidence or skepticism in judges' ability to judge
fairly. Id. at 2, 3 and accompanying notes.
33. Now the National Institute of Justice, A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 44,
n.13.
34. Plante, Abernathy, Salokar and Kern, Judicial Sentencing - Help is on the
Way, FLA. BAR. J. 536, 537 (1981).
35. Together the NIJ and LEAA awarded $270,000 to the Office of the State
Court's Administrator for testing the Guidelines in four of Florida's twenty Circuits.
The circuits tested were the 4th (consisting of Clay, Duval, and Nassau Counties) the
10th (Hardee, Highland, and Polk Counties) the 14th (Bay, Calhoun, Gulf, Holmes,
Jackson and Washington Counties) and the 15th (Palm Beach County). Id. at 536,
537.
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pleteness of sentencing records, 2) the relationship between presentence
investigation reports and sentencing decisions, 3) the mixture of rural
and urban areas, 4) the variety of political and social values reflective
of the state as a whole and 5) the judges' agreement to cooperate with
and participate in the one-year implementation period.36 An advisory
board from each circuit oversaw the progress of the project. The boards
consisted of the chief judge (or his representative) and eight other
members from each of the four jurisdictions, reflecting a desire for a
diverse group of experts.37
C. The Historical Model
In the initial formulation of the guidelines, the past sentencing
practices of Florida judges served as a basis for determining sentence
ranges for various crimes. This historical approach resulted in a model
which represented what sentencing had been, rather than what it ought
to be. Advisory boards were provided with a sampling of felony cases
concluded during the three previous years, thus insuring a variety of
judges' decisions, and encompassing a broad range of cases. 38 In all,
15,613 cases were sampled, consisting of 194 different criminal of-
fenses. Some offenses occurred far more frequently than others with
sixty-five statutes making up eighty-five percent of the felony caseload.
These sixty-five statutory offenses were categorized into six groups, by
similarities among "offense and offender characteristics. ' 39 Statutory
violations not occurring within this eighty-five percent portion were not
analyzed further.40
36. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1,at 5.
37. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, MULTIJURISDICTIONAL SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES PROJECT, FINAL REPORT 3 (1982) [hereinafter cites as FINAL
REPORT].
38. Id. at 4.
39. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 6, 7.
40. Id. at 7. One hundred twenty nine statutes comprised the remaining 15% of
the felony cases. The advisory board felt the infrequency of these occurences demanded
the individualized attention of the trial judge and chose to leave it entirely to his discre-
tion. Id. at 7 & n.18. The offense categories were: Category 1: Murder, Manslaughter,
Kidnapping, Lewd and Lascivious Assault; Category 2: Aggravated Assault, Aggra-
vated Battery, Battery of Law Enforcement Officer; Category 3: Burglary with Assault,
Burglary of an Occupied Dwelling, Structure or Conveyence, Robbery; Category 4:
Armed Robbery, Burglary of an Unoccupied Dwelling, Structure or Conveyence; Cate-
gory 5: Grand Larceny or Theft, Dealing in and Receiving Stolen Property, Forgery,
Worthless Checks; Category 6: Possession, Sale, Delivery, Importation of a' Controlled
[Vol. 8
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From the eighty-five percent group, a random sample of 6,826
cases was taken, of which 5,100 were coded and analyzed."' Informa-
tion variables were compiled and statistically analyzed to identify deci-
sion making factors historically used by judges.42 The advisory boards
then qualitatively analyzed these factors, to prevent the continued use
of undesirable and inappropriate variables from being factored into the
guidelines. 3 The remaining sentencing factors were used to develop a
mathematical model for explaining the sentencing practices historically
used in the four jurisdictions.44
This process of eliminating inappropriate or undesirable factors
constitutes something of a compromise in the underlying rationale or
policy of the guidelines. The Florida Sentencing Guidelines, though
similar in many ways to the Minnesota guidelines, 45 do not adhere to
Substance. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 9. Problems in locating files and the files' incompleteness precluded
using the other 1726 cases.
42. Id. at 10. The records used for this information included pre and post sen-
tence investigation reports, prison admission documentations and criminal history
records, or "rap sheets."
43. Id. at 11. Among the factors eliminated were: "Lack of Remorse" and "Ex-
tent of Victim Scarring or Disfigurement". These factors were deemed highly subjec-
tive and too difficult to quantify in a general fashion. They may properly influence a
judge, but must do so on a case by case basis. "Victim's sex" should not make any
difference in sentencing, but the relative sizes and physical appearances may be consid-
ered. See Id. at 12-14. "Number of Dependants" was characterized as "having no
place in the sentencing process", and the "Type of Victim", whether an individual,
business, or government... should not make a difference." Id. at 16, 17.
44. Id. at 19. For a description of the model see id. at 19, 20. Cf W. RICH, C.
SUTTON, T. CLEAR, M. SAKS, supra note 1, at 33-89.
45. Both Minnesota and Florida have provisions prohibiting the use of factors
related to offenses for which convictions have not been obtained. Both delete first de-
gree murder from the guidelines because of a statutorily mandatory sentence. The
statements of purpose of each run along similar principles: the first in each requires
that "[s]entencing should be neutral with respect to. . .race, gen-
der. . .social. . .economic status", Florida's 3rd and 4th principles and Minnesoata's
2nd provide that punishment should increase with the severity of the offenses and the
offender's criminal record. Florida's 6th principle and Minnesota's 4th provide that the
guidelines prescribed sentence should be imposed unless exceptional ("clear and con-
vincing" in Florida, and "substantial and compelling" in Minnesota) circumstances ex-
ist. Florida's 7th and Minnesota's 3rd principles provide, "[b]ecause the capacities of
state and local correctional facilities are finte, use of incarcerative sanctions should be
limited to those convicted of more serious offenses or those who have longer criminal
histories. To ensure such usage of finite resources, sanctions used in sentencing con-
victed felons should be the least restrictive necessary to achieve the purpose of the
7
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Minnesota's ultimate decision to completely reject the historicist ap-
proach.46 There, the Sentencing Commission considered analyzing past
practices of judges to develop the guidelines, but they determined that
the mere elimination of inappropriate factors would distort the relative
weights to be assigned to the more appropriate relevant factors.4
Moreover, the strictly historical approach was seen as evading such im-
portant issues as why certain crimes are punished more severely than
others, and whether more severe punishment is warranted. Minnesota
therefore adopted the policy of taking an active role in deciding which
sentencing considerations should be taken into account, how much
weight to assign to each consideration, which sentencing aims should be
targeted4 8 and, perhaps most importantly, the seriousness of different
offenses.49
This last task of evaluating offenses reflects a major difference be-
tween Florida's original guidlelines, as used in the pilot program, and
Minnesota's guidelines. Minnesota's Commission utilized rating tech-
nique based on its own personal and collective judgments, to determine
the seriousness of various crimes. The Minnesota Commission thereby
reevaluated crime categories and rated them accordingly. Such rating
reflects an important step toward making a reasoned judgment about
the relative moral turpitude of various classifications of crimes. To his-
torically analyze legislative or judicial decisions would sacrifice a con-
sistent and express rationale. Similarly, reliance upon a public poll
would risk maintenance of a haphazardly and ill-founded tradition
which lacks a reasoned coherence °
In the Florida pilot program guidelines, this sacrifice was indeed
made. Thus, the severe sentences of notoriously controversial crimes,
such as possession or sale of small amounts of marijuana or cocaine,
remained virtually untouchbd by the guidelines. Reliance upon purely
historical data, and only deleting "variables deemed inappropriate for
use in sentencing"51 maintained the underlying qualitative evaluation
of offenses for which the defendant was charged. Therefore, although
the guidelines "represent[ed] a prescriptive model of what factors
sentence." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701 and MINN. STAT. app. § 244 (1983).
46. von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 175.
47. Id. at 174.
48. Id. at 174, 75
49. Id. at 175, 197, 198,
50. Id. at 197, 198.
51. S. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 11.
694 [Vol. 8
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'should' be considered in the sentencing process, '5 2 the benefit of criti-
cally reevaluating those sentencing practices as they relate to the dis-
tinct substantive areas of crime was forfeited.
With the aid of the historical data, a mathematical model was
used to construct six separate guidelines, one for each offense category.
After training seminars were held for members of the bar and bench,
clerks and probation personnel,5" these guidelines were used in the pilot
program in the four jurisdictions." Florida Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Sundberg and the staff 5 visited the participating jurisdictions dur-
ing the pilot program."' The committee made 'evisions accordingly 57
and analyzed the guidelines "scoresheets." 58
The committee then recommended the creation of a "sentence re-
view panel" 59 to review sentences outside the guidelines. Nonetheless,
during the pilot program, the sentences imposed were not subject to
any formal review.60 Direct review of sentences was not part of Flor-
ida's appellate system and appeals could not be allowed in only four
jurisdictions.61 However, the committee felt sentence review was a "key
52. Id. at 20.
53. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37. at 23-25.
54. In addition to the concerns mentioned above, other criticisms included: 1) the
sentences were either too harsh or too lenient, 2) the decrease in disparity was undesir-
able in that the variation is merely an expression of local mores, 3) the judges may not
be able to use enough discretion, 4) the defendant's prior record was not given enough
attention, 5) mitigating factors needed to be identified and 6) the guidelines were too
"negative[ly]" oriented. Id. at 25, 26.
55. The guideline staff consisted of Donna L. Braziel and Kenneth J. Plante,
Project Directors, Susan K. Wilson, Data Entry Supervisor, and Doris Puffer, Secre-
tary. Id. at second unnumbered page.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 23-25. The "scoresheets" are used to determine the presumptive sen-
tence range. "Points are assigned for various offense and offender related characteris-
tics and total score calculated. This score is then used to enter a one-dimensional ma-
trix with score ranges correlated to sentences. The median sentence figure is
recommended, accompanied by a minimum and maximium range which may be im-
posed at the discretion of the Court." Id. at 21.
58. Id. at 22. For a complete description of this process, including project data,
graphs and charts, see Sundberg, Plante, and Braziel, Florida's Initial Experience with
Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FLA. ST. L. REV. 125 (1983) and FINAL REPORT, supra note
37.
59. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 31-36.
60. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 21. But see, Layton v. State, 432 So. 2d
195 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
61. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 21
1984]
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element in the entire concept of sentencing guidelines." 2 Therefore,
the finalized guidelines recognize departures from the guidelines as a
ground for appeal by either the state or defendant.6"
D. Florida Sentencing Guidelines Commission
Chief Justice Sundberg recommended creation of a sentencing
commission to develop and periodically revise statewide guidelines."
Accordingly, the legislature enacted section 921.001 of the Florida
Statutes on April 7, 1982 approving his recommendation. 65
The Commission created by this statute was not required to report
on the "exact mechanism/methodology used to develop and implement
the guidelines, 66 so that most of the changes from the original guide-
lines used in the pilot program are left unexplained. For example, the
finalized guidelines have nine offense categories, as opposed to six in
the pilot program.6 7 Apparently the Committee saw the need to rede-
fine these categories more specifically to correct overbroad classifica-
tions of offenses.6 8 Although the minutes of the Commission meetings
reflect these changes, no particular reasons are cited to explain the al-
terations. In the finalized guidelines, many of the same procedures for
determining sentences were used as in the original guidelines. As in the
originals, statistical analysis was employed to develop a mathematical
model for the guidelines. 69 The Commission then developed the guide-
lines by utilizing the statistical data provided by the project as to past
sentencing practices.
62. Id.
63. FLA. STAT. § 921.001(2) and (3) (1983) (amending FLA. STAT. § § 924.06
and 924.07 (1983).
64. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 36-41.
65. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37 at 34 and text of bill at Appendices a, A-1 -
A-3.
66. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 39.
67. Cf. supra note 40 and FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.988(a)-(i).
68. The compliance rate for certain categories was much lower than others. See
A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at Appendix C.
69. The Commission randomly selected 3,977 felony cases from 58,000 convic-
tions filed in 1981. Criminal history records, or "rap sheets," pre- and post- sentence
investigation reports an admission summaries were used to code 233 variables. The
staff then analyzed these variables to determine which ones accounted for the length
and type of sentence. Introduction to FLORIDA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL (1983) [hereinafter cites as MANUAL].
[Vol. 8
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III. The Florida Sentencing Guidelines
A. Philosophy
In July 1983, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission released
drafts of the finalized guidelines, including a statement of purpose,
committee notes, and comments.70 A draft was published in the Florida
Bar News, 71 and was later approved by the Florida Supreme Court72
after final modifications. The Commission adopted a retributive philos-
ophy in fashioning the guidelines: "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing
is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation and other traditional consider-
ations continue to be desired goals. . . but must assume a subordinate
role."'73 Additionally, the guidelines provide for harsher punishments
for recidivists than for first offenders. The more numerous and severe in
nature the past convictions, the more severe incarcerative sanctions will
be.74 Practical considerations were also woven into the guidelines, by
making an a priori decision to extend the scope of the guidelines to
"serve as a mechanism for dealing with prison overcrowding. .... ,,7
The commission recognized that "[b]ecause the capacities of state and
local correctional facilities are finite, use of incarcerative sanctions
should be limited to those persons convicted of more serious offenses or
those who have longer criminal histories. To ensure such usage of finite
resources, sanctions used in sentencing convicted felons should be the
least restrictive possible." '
The policy of including prison capacity as a consideration for de-
signing the guidelines is another point where the Florida Commission
followed the lead of the Minnesota guidelines.7 7 Although some author-
ities contend that this policy is an ethical consideration, since it is "sim-
ply wrong to sentence people to overcrowded prisons," 78 the ethical
problem results from an economic dilemma. The problem of over-
crowded prisons can be solved in several ways, including building more
70. Id.
71. 10 FLA. B. NEws 14, 5-7. See also accompanying article Orrick, Court Re-
ceives Sentencing Guidelines, Id. at 1, 7-9.
72. Sentencing Guidelines, 439 So. 2d 848.
73. MANUAL, supra note 69, at 3.
74. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(4).
75. MANUAL, supra note 69, at Introduction.
76. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(7).
77. See von Hirsch, supra note 8 at 176-80.
78. Id. at 176.
19841
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prisons, incarcerating fewer people, or releasing more prisoners by pa-
role. However, authorities meet with difficulties regarding the first op-
tion; they are faced with political factions unwilling or unable to con-
vince the public that more funding needs to be appropriated for more
prisons.7 9 Once this alternative has been eliminated because of mone-
tary concerns, it becomes a matter of ethics to decide who is most in
need of incarceration, and who society should continue to have in its
midst. Ethical considerations necessarily involve reevaluating the
blameworthiness of various classifications of substantive crimes. The
Commission therefore incorporated ethical and practical concerns into
the finalized guidelines.80 Controversial crimes such as prostitution,
drug offenses, and other victimless crimes, were deliberated at length
and reappraised on a normative level. Hence, the decision to base
sentences on the "length and nature of the offender's criminal his-
tory,"' the "severity of the convicted offense,"82 as well as the capacity
of prisons 3 manifest moral and economical considerations. A brief in
opposition to the guidelines filed with the Florida Supreme Court
before their final approval criticized the Commission for considering
prison capacity in sentencing. "We maintain that the safety, and emo-
tional and physical well being of our society must be paramount to
concerns about jail overcrowding."84
79. More importantly, even if funding were appropriated, it is doubtful whether
this would solve the problem. Florida is already the "most incarcerative state in the
nation, imprisoning a greater percentage of its population than any other state."
Lohman, Florida's Overcrowded Prisons, too little space or too many people?, FLA. B.
J., April 1983, at 199. Twelve major prisons have been built since 1974. Id. Nonethe-
less, this high rate of incarceration apparently has no deterrent effect on the commis-
sion of crime. Id. at 201.
80. von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 179.
The Minnesota Commission made the existing prison capacities decisive of
the aggregate use of imprisonment under the Guidelines. The normative
questions, for the Commission, were those of allocation: with classes of
convicted prisoners, for how long, and for what reasons, should be allo-
cated to this prison bedspace? The aggregate use of imprisonment was
thus decided on the basis of what facilities were in fact available. The
Commission did not make a normative judgment about how much, apart
from the availability of resources, the state ought to rely upon the prison
sanction.
Id. (Emphasis in original.)
81. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(4).
82. Id. at (b)(3).
83. Id. at (b)(7).
84. M. Satz, R. Stone, E. Whitworth, K. Zuelch, J. Appleman, R. Eagan, J.
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The guidelines are intended to serve as a standard to aid the sen-
tencing judge in the decision-making process.8 5 "However, while struc-
turing judicial discretion, the guidelines are sufficiently flexible to per-
mit the judge to tailor the sentence to the individual offender." 86 This
standard should then "eliminate unwarranted variation in the sentenc-
ing process by reducing the subjectivity in interpreting specific offense-
and offender-related criteria and in defining their relative importance
in the sentencing decision."187 The sentencing judge is thus provided
with a narrow range of recommended sentences from which to choose.
B. Judicial Discretion to Depart from the Guidelines
To depart from a guideline-imposed sentence, the circumstances of
a case must clearly and convincingly warrant aggravating or mitigating
the sentence.8 There is no defined list of appropriate aggravating or
mitigating factors;8 9 consequently, judges are free to read the entire
record and develop their own reasons to shorten or lengthen the sen-
tence beyond the guidelines' range. The Committee comment states
that each criminal case is unique, so that a comprehensive list of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances is not given. 90 However, by ex-
cluding specific factors, the Commission risks allowing judges to stray
from the policy of the guidelines and create a judicial doctrine different
from the guidelines' underlying purpose."' A judge need only make a
written statement explaining why he departed from the guidelines. 92
Such a statement becomes part of the record, and should be specific
enough to inform all parties and the public why departure was neces-
sary." This written statement need not be a lengthy discussion--often
two or three words will suffice to explain. Allowing the procedure to be
simple, however, increases the opportunity for discretion. The sentenc-
ing study committee commented:
Gardner, D. Modesitt and C. Golden, Petitioners Brief in Opposition, Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure (Rule 3.701) Sentencing Guidelines, Case No. 63,962, at 5 (1983).
85. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b).
86. MANUAL supra note 69, at Introduction 2.
87. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b).
88. Id. at (b)(6) and (d)(11).
89. MANUAL, supra note 69, at 10, comment to 11.
90. Id.
91. See von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 205.
92. FLA. R. CgiM. P. 3.701, Committee Note (d)(11).
93. Id.
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Although the purpose of sentencing guidelines is the reduction
of unwarranted sentence variation, the need for some variation is
recognized and is indeed promoted. It is anticipated that that from
15-20% of the sentencing decisions will routinely fall outside of the
recommended range. At no time should sentencing guidelines be
viewed as the final word in the sentencing process. .... The spe-
cific circumstances of the offense may be used to either aggravate
or mitigate the sentence within the guideline range or, if the of-
fense and offender characteristics are sufficiently compelling, used
as a basis for imposing a sentence outside of the guidelines.94
Predictions have proved to be correct; 81.1% of the cases in the
pilot program were in fact within the sentence range recommended by
the guidelines.95 There is no evidence of how representative this compli-
ance rate will be because of changes in the guidelines and implementa-
tion throughout the entire state. Factors such as the willingness and
commitment of the judges in the pilot program to cooperate with the
guidelines project, the knowledge that appeals were not possible in the
pilot program, and restructuring of the new guidelines themselves96
may affect compliance on a statewide level.9 7
The fear that the just-deserts policy of the guidelines woud be con-
travened by not supplying aggravating and mitigating factors to judges
was recognized and acted upon by Minnesota.98 There, the guidelines
include a non-exclusive list of reasons appropriate for departure,99 as
well a a list of factors inappropriate to justify departure. 100 Appropriate
reasons for departure go to the nature of the offense itself, rather than
to the offender; inappropriate reasons for departure relate specifically
to the offender's personal and social status.101
Minnesota's reasoning seems consistent with its choice to advocate
94. A. SUNDBERG, supra note 1, at 22.
95. FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 30.
96. For changes from the pilot program to the final guidelines, see supra notes
64-69 and accompanying text.
97. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 30 and Appendix F for compliance
rate information.
98. von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 205-07.
99. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 II. D. 2(a) and (b) (West Supp. 1982), reprinted
in 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 395 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES, HAMLINE].
100. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 II D. l(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1982). See also
GUIDELINES, HAMLINE, supra note 99.
101. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; von Hirsch, supra note 8,
at 206, 207.
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a "modified just-desert"10 2 rationale as opposed to one of rehabilita-
tion.10 3 Given the just-desert/incapacitative philosophy, factors such as
employment history, the impact of the sentence on occupation or pro-
fession, and marital status are deemed irrelevant to the retribution that
should be made for a particular offense. 4 This policy offends many
peoples' sense of compassion and mercy. A hard-working person with a
family to support, who will lose his job because of a jail sentence,
seems less culpable than one who has no family or community ties,
drifts in and out of jobs and burdens society for his support. While
some of these factors may be "manipulable" by offenders who would
marry, take a job, or become a parent as a ploy,105 it seems unwise to
abandon centuries of almost universally accepted values because of this
possibility. Surely judges are aware of the potential for abuse, and fac-
tor it into their sentencing decisions.
Although rehabilitation is no longer a primary goal for the crimi-
nal process generally, factors predicting the potential for rehabilitation
continue to be proper sentencing considerations. A sentencing philoso-
phy which treats all crimes alike, without regard to differences between
those who commit them, "is dehumanizing and has grave and dehu-
manizing implications for all of society." 1 6 It is important for reform-
ers to look beyond the theoretical differences in philosophies and retain
basic humanitarian concerns.
Florida reformers appear to have done this. By not prescribing a
list of factors which must be referred to for justifying departure, the
Commission seems to have endorsed use of the defendant's personal
characteristics in sentencing. Apparently, the fear of allowing too much
discretion to the judges was outweighed by the realization that more
than a mathematical formula is needed when dealing with individuals'
lives.
To limit discretion, albeit with use of some provisions already
102. von Hirsch, supra note 8, at 182. The term "modified" indicates the fact
that the just desert philosophy is blended with an incapacitive one as well. Id.
103. Id. at 206, citing a letter from Andrew von Hirsch to Dale G. Parent (Oct.
8, 1979).
104. GUIDELINES, HAMLINE, supra note 99, at 411.
105. "Manipulability" is the reason the Minnesota Guidelines Commission ex-
cluded employment as a sentencing consideration. Id. at 412, Comment II. D. 101.
106. D. POINTER, C. ROSENSTEIN, and M. KRAVITZ, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERMI-
NATE SENTENCING: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, 3 (1982) (summarizing B. Alper and
J. Weis, MANDATORY SENTENCE - RECIPE FOR RETRIBUTION, V 41, N. 4 FED. PROBA-
TION, 15-20 (December 1977)).
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mandated by the Constitution, the Commission provided direction by
noting that "[s]entencing should be neutral with respect to race, gen-
der, and social and economic status."107 These factors are precisely the
kinds of considerations which unfairly bias judges and result in unwar-
ranted disparity in sentencing.
C. The Standard for Departure
1. A Last Minute Change
The July 1983 draft of the Florida Sentencing Guidelines provided
that "substantial and compelling" 10 8 circumstances were needed to jus-
tify departures from the guidelines. The "substantial and compelling"
standard was derived from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.10 9 In
Minnesota, where the "substantial and compelling" test controls depar-
tures, it proved to command a fairly strict adherence to the presump-
tive sentences of the guidelines. 10 However, the final guidelines which
were adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in September, 1983, pro-
vide that "clear and convincing reasons" ' are necessary for the trial
court to deviate from the presumptive guideline range.1
The reasons for the Commission's decision to change the standard
for departure are not explicit. The switch occured on August 26, 1983,
at the Commission's final meeting, following the receipt of suggestions
and comments spurred by the proposed rule's publication in the Florida
Bar News earlier that summer. After the Commission considered these
suggestions and comments several changes were made, one of which
was the test for departure. The reason for favoring the "clear and con-
vincing" standard may be that it does appear in several other areas of
Florida law,113 whereas the "substantial and compelling" test is only
107. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(1).
108. MANUAL, supra note 70, at 3, Principles 6 and 10, comment 11.
109. GUIDELINES, HAMLINE, supra note 99, at 395.
110. Note, Minnesota Supreme Court Cases, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 319, 332
(1982). "[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently upheld the basic tenets of
the Sentencing Guidelines and has demonstrated that it will require the trial judge to
subordinate their own view about the sentencing process, and act according to the stip-
ulations of the Guidelines." Id. at 332.
111. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(6) and (d)(11).
112. Id.
113. See infra notes 147-56 for the areas of Florida law utilizing the "clear and
convincing" test.
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used in the context of constitutional challenges based on fundamental
rights. In these cases, the state must prove it has a "substantial and
compelling" interest to justify the challenged classification, and that
the means used to achieve the legislative end are "necessarily and pre-
cisely drawn." 114
The Florida Supreme Court has characterized that test as "almost
always fatal in its application, imposing a heavy burden of justification
upon the state. .. ."15 Therefore, it appears that the greater familiar-
ity with the "clear and convincing" standard alone may not entirely
account for the Commission's decision to adopt it. The real reason for
the change may have been pressure from prosecutors who felt that
judges would need a more lenient standard to depart from the guide-
lines. State attorneys have criticized the guidelines' sentences for being
too short. Broward County State Attorney Michael Satz is typical of
the prosecutors who say that the new sentences are too short, and that
criminals will not be getting what they truly deserve.116 In response to
that criticism, however, Senator Crawford, drafter of the original Sen-
ate Bill, counters that the old sentencing system was a "fraud" against
the media and the public."' "The judges' sentences are often ignored"
and have "become meaningless."" 8 The fraud Crawford refers to ex-
isted because the actual term served as determined by the Probation
and Parole Commission, which often resulted in sentences being re-
duced by over one half.119 Because the guidelines effectively eliminate
the early release of prisoners by parole,120 the sentences are much
shorter than the ones Florida has imposed in the past. Nevertheless,
state attorneys from at least ten Florida circuits oppose the guidelines
because "the sentences listed are entirely too lenient, and. . .the ranges
allowed for deviation are entirely too small."12 ' Other criticisms of the
114. In Re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla.), dismissed 67 L.Ed.2d
610, 101 S. Ct. 1475 (1980).
115. Id. at 43.
116. Pellegrino, New Sentencing Plan Finds Few Allies, Fort Lauderdale News/
Sun Sentinel, June 12, 1983, at A 12 col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Allies].
117. Hillstom, New 'Truth in Sentencing' Rules begin Oct. 1, Miami Herald,
Sept. 11, 1983, at D 1, col. 2, 3. The term used in the title here is not to be confused
with "real offense sentencing" discussed infra, text accompanying notes 163-171.
118. Id. at D 2, col. 1.
119. See Chart at Allies, supra note 116, at A 12.
120. FLA. STAT. § 921.001(8) (1983).
121. M. Satz, R. Stone, E. Whitworth, K. Zuelch, J. Appleman, R. Eagan, J.
Gardner, D. Modesitt and C. Golden, Petitioners Brief in Opposition, Rules of Crimi-
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test attack its potential for creating an unconstitutional assumption by
the court "through its rule making power of legislative authority to en-
act substantive law.' 22
With such vocal opposition to the "substantial and compelling" re-
quirement, it is not surprising that the Commission struck it from the
guidelines and replaced it with the less stringent "clear and convinc-
ing" standard. It is questionable, however, how much of a concession
this actually is. The new test may act as a two-edged sword, because
defense attorneys can also request downward departures from the
guidelines for defendants, judged by the same test. Whatever the rea-
sons for the change, the fact remains that "clear and convincing," not
"substantial and compelling" reasons are necessary.
The change may be merely rhetorical and not lower the standard
for departure whatsoever. In Minnesota, where the language for depar-
ture remains "substantial and compelling," it has arguably been
equated with "clear and convincing." In State v. Olson,12 3 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court stated: "[s]ubstantial and compelling evidence at
the Sentencing Hearing with respect to the overall excellent back-
ground and character of the defendant had been received, and [was]
"clear and convincing."' 24 The two tests stand side by side in this case,
apparently without conflict. If this language does not make the tests
synonomous, it at least raises considerable doubt as to which is more
stringent.
The terms of the tests themselves seem to be somewhat correlative.
A "substantial" reason is likely to be a "clear" reason, and vice versa,
and a "compelling" reason is likely to be a "convincing" reason. How-
ever, the terms do not seem to be identical: it is possible to have a
convincing reason which is not compelling. In that regard, perhaps the
"substantial and compelling" test is more rigid. Whatever the relation-
ship of the tests, a review of the cases in Minnesota may provide a
sense of the kinds of issues that may be raised on appeal in Florida. If
"substantial and compelling" is indeed a more rigid test, the reasons
which have withstood appellate review there will certainly pass muster
under Florida's test.
nal Procedure (Rule 3.701) Sentencing Guidelines, Case No. 63,962, at 10 (1983).
122. J. Reno, Comments Regarding Porposed Sentence Guidelines, In re Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Proposed Rule 3.710, [sic] Regarding Sentencing Guidelines,
Case No. 63,962 at 2 (1983).
123. 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982).
124. Id. at 15.
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2. Minnesota Cases
The first Minnesota Supreme Court case interpreting that state's
guidelines manifested a strong support of them. In State v. Garcia,125
the parties had negotiated a plea in an attempt to shorten the guide-
line-prescribed sentence. This plea was rejected by the trial court, and
the Supreme Court upheld that decision. The Court reproved, "[o]nly
the court, acting in accordance with the Guidelines, and not the par-
ties, has the authority to determine the appropriate sentence. ' 12 Under
the Florida Sentencing Guidelines, plea bargaining will still exist, but it
will take on a new character. Much of the negotiation will be over the
charge at conviction itself, and the points assigned for variables such as
"victim injury" rather than on the length of the sentence.
The Minnesota cases that followed Garcia continued to scrutinize
the trial courts' decisions very closely, and to insist upon a careful read-
ing of and compliance with the guidelines. Among the factors which
were rejected by the Supreme Court of Minnesota as not being "sub-
stantial and compelling" so as to warrant an upward departure from
the guidelines were: the trial court's belief that the defendant was dan-
gerous and that he had taken drugs during the offense,1 7 the trial
court's speculation that the morphine stolen in an aggravated robbery
of a pharmancy would be distributed in the future, 2" the fact that the
defendant was driving without a license during the offense, his "lack of
candor," the inadequacy of facilities available in the community to re-
habilitate him, and his alleged continued prostitution.12 9 Generally, the
court flatly refused to uphold departures based on factors which were
already figured into the offense's guideline prescribed sentence, such as
criminal history record whether good or bad. 30 In a few cases, reversal
of the trial court's departure rested on the simple grounds that no valid
arguments for departure were given. 131
Factors which were found to warrant an aggravated departure
125. 302 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1981).
126. Id. at 647.
127. State v. Magnan, 328 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 1983).
128. State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981).
129. State v. Barnes, 313 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1981).
130. Magnan, 328 N.W.2d at 149 (an upward departure), and State v. Cizl, 304
N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 1981) (a downward departure).
131. State v. Nelson, 326 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. 1982), State v. Johnson 314
N.W.2d 229 (Minn. 1982); State v. Leibfried, 309 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1981); and
State v. Bellanger, 304 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1981).
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were generally those which are specifically listed in the Minnesota
guidelines.' 32 For instance, "victim vulnerability,"' 33 due to infancy or
old age, was frequently upheld as a reason for an upward departure
from the guidelines. "[P]articular cruelty" to the victim, that is, cru-
elty "of a kind not usually associated with commission of the offense in
question,"' 1 4 was also cited often as an appropriate aggravating fac-
tor.'35 Other proper reasons for an upward diviation include: infliction
of an injury, 36 intruding upon a victim's zone of privacy by assailing
the victim in his/her own home,3 7 and neglecting the medical needs of
the victim after the infliction of injury. 38
In addition to deciding whether a departure was warranted, the
court also ruled as to whether departures were excessive. A basic prin-
ciple was set down in State v. Evans. 39 There the court ruled that,
"generally, in a case in which an upper departure in sentence length is
justified, the upper limit will be double the presumptive sentence
length."' 4 This tenet sets only the upper limit, however, and was not
intended to be the rule for all departures, nor is it an iron-clad rule that
sentences cannot exceed the doubled limitation. "[T]here may be rare
cases in which the facts are so unusually compelling that an even
greater degree of departure will be justified."''
132. See supra notes 90-94, and accompanying text.
133. State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1983); State v. Jones, 328
N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1983); State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 1983); State v.
Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 1982); State v. Partlow, 321 N.W.2d 886
(Minn. 1982); State v. Stumm, 312 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. 1981).
134. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d at 487.
135. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 187; Jones 328 N.W.2d at 736; Norton 328 N.W.2d
at 142; Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d at 633; Partlow, 321 N.W.2d at 886; State v. Marti-
nez, 319 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1982); Stumm, 312 N.W.2d at 248; State v. Evans, 311
N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1981); State v. Fairbanks, 308 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1981).
136. Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d at 634.
137. Id. at 635; Jones 328 N.W.2d at 738.
138. Stumm, 312 N.W.2d at 249.
139. 311 N.W.2d at 481.
140. Id. at 483.
141. Id. In Stumm, 312 N.W.2d at 248, and Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d at 633,
the court upheld sentences exceeding the doubled presumptive sentences. The Stumm
court held that the "absolute vulnerability of the helpless victim," who was a two year
old child, justified an extreme departure, Stumm, 312 N.W.2d at 249. In Van Gorden,
the combination of the 66 year old victim's age, the aggravated nature of the miscon-
duct, permanent injury to the eyes resulting in vision loss, three distinct sexual penetra-
tions invading the privacy zone of the victim's home, and dragging the victim outside
her home, thereby increasing her fright, warranted the departure, Van Gorden, 326
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A case which presented a blatant disregard of the guidelines by
the sentencing judge was State v. Bellanger.142 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court quoted the trial court as stating, "there is a great deal too
much made of regularity and conformity in sentencing."'143 The su-
preme court flatly reversed the upward departure, admonishing,
"[g] eneral disagreement with the Guidelines or 'the legislative policy on
which the Guidelines are based does not justify departure.91 44
This survey of the Minnesota cases concerning the guidelines dem-
onstrates the effect of the "substantial and compelling" standard. Ad-
herence to the presumptive sentence is the rule, and departure clearly
the exception. How close to this result the Florida cases will be is a
matter of speculation at this point, because of inherent differences be-
tween the two sets of guidelines, the standard for departures, and the
two states' laws in general. However, because of the great similarities
in the two Sentencing Guidelines Commissions' intents and goals, and
because of the absence of case law directly on point in Florida, these
cases may provide some direction for the courts here.
3. "Clear and Convincing" in Florida
The "clear and convincing" standard has been used in Florida in a
variety of legal settings. It is the proper standard of proof for the estab-
lishment of entitlement to a trust, 45 the introduction of hypnotically
refreshed testimony,14 6 civil commitment,1 47 disbarment, 48 actual mal-
ice in defamation cases,1 49 permanent commitment of an adopted child
to the new parents, 150 establishing that Miranda warnings were
N.W.2d at 634, 635.
142. 304 N.W.2d 282 (1981).
143. Id. at 283.
144. Id.
145. Hiestand v. Geier, 396 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied,
407 So. 2d 1103 (1981).
146. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 91 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1983).
147. In Re Preer Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 488 (Fla. 1977); Gorchov v. State,
354 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
148. The Florida Bar v. Rayman, 238 So. 2d 594, 598 (Fla. 1970); Abstract and
Title Corp. of Florida v. Cochran, 414 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
149. Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc. 408 So. 2d 666, 669 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), reh. denied, 103 S. Ct. 838, dismissed 74 L. Ed. 2d 44, 103 S.
Ct. 29. Gibson v. Maloney, 263 So. 2d 632, 637 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 984.
150. In Re the Adoption of J.G.R., 432 So. 2d 735, 735 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
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given, 151 the voluntariness of a confession to criminal charges,'152 the
reformation of a contract, 5 and the impeachment of service of pro-
cess. 54 A thread of similarity runs through all of these situations.
There is no perceived need for the criminal standard of "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt," yet each controversy seems to demand more than a
mere preponderance. This need stems from either the seriousness or the
finality of the disputed matter's impending judgment. Prior to sentenc-
ing proceedings, a criminal defendant's guilt will have been proved "be-
yond a reasonable doubt." The sentence imposed under Florida's sen-
tencing guidelines has been approved through the appropriate channels.
The "clear and convincing" standard only applies to decisions to devi-
ate from the prescribed sentence. The imposition of a criminal sentence
being quite a serious matter, however, a standard more strict than "a
preponderance" was deemed appropriate.
It may seem surprising that, even though applied in a number of
areas, the term "clear and convincing" had not been satisfactorily de-
fined by Florida courts until recently. 55 In State v. Graham,'56 the
problem of defining the standard was described as follows:
Wigmore went to the heart of the matter: 'The truth is that no one
has yet invented or discovered a mode of measurement for the in-
tensity of human belief.' We communicate with words rather than
numbers in the legal profession, and this forces us to verbalize
standards for the subjective feeling of probability engendered by
evidence. Broadly, we say that the measure of persuasion in crimi-
nal cases is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while civil cases re-
quire the lesser measure of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Wigmore, however, recognizes that a 'stricter standard,' in
some such phrase as 'clear and convincing proof' is commonly used
to measure the necessary persuasion in certain matters.157
In April of 1983, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
1983); In the Interest of T.C., a child, 417 So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
151. State v. Graham, 240 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
152. Id.
153. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Vanater, 297 So. 2d 293, 298 (Fla. 1974).
154. Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
155. Id. at 799.
156. Graham, 240 So. 2d at 486.
157. Id. at 490.
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went to great lengths to define the standard in Slomowitz v. Walker:158
[C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be
found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must
be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be directly
remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the
witness must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The
evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the trier of fact
a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established.Y59
This definition is presumably as good as any, given the nature of
the concept. What is important to realize is that "clear and convinc-
ing" is a phrase which is normally used to determine the quantum of
evidence or proof necessary to establish the truth of a disputed matter
for the finder of fact. In the sentencing guidelines, however, "clear and
convincing" is a descriptive phrase modifying the rationale accompany-
ing a departure from the prescribed sentence. It is not the quantum of
evidence necessary to prove that the reasons exist. Therefore, the mean-
ing of the term becomes even more elusive. Hopefully, any reason a
judge would have for sentencing a convicted felon to one term rather
than another would be a valid one and therefore "clear." And presuma-
bly, any reason for imposing a sentence outside the guidelines would be
"convincing" to the judge that it is a valid reason to depart. The ques-
tions that remain to be answered are how the interpretation of the
"clear and convincing" standard will affect departures from the guide-
lines, and the direction that the new body of case law will take.
D. The End of "Real Offense Sentencing"' °
"Reasons for deviating from the guidelines shall not include fac-
tors relating to prior arrests without conviction. Reasons for deviating
from the guidelines shall not include factors relating to the instant of-
fenses for which convictions have not been obtained,"' 61 "This state-
158. Slomowitz, 429 So. 2d 797.
159 Id. at 800.
160. This term was used in NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT (Approved Draft 1978),
located in 10 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., (master ed. West 1974) (Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL ACT].
161. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(11). The Sentencing Guidelines Commission
presented recommendations for changes to the Florida Supreme Court which included
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ment in the Florida's guidelines represents an attempt by the Commis-
sion to end the practice of "real offense sentencing,"' 6 2 sanctioned by
the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act. Real offense sentencing re-
quires the court to ignore the charge at conviction and to base the sanc-
tion on the defendant's "actual offense behavior. "163 Criticisms of the
practice in general and the Model Act's advocacy of it "range from the
constitutional to the principled to the practical.' ' 4
The primary objection, however, is that real offense sentencing
simply does not seem fair.6 5 A defendant should be sentenced for the
charge at conviction, and not for prior dismissed charges or acquittals.
Moreover, where plea bargaining is utilized in fixing the offense, defen-
dants must be sentenced according to their negotiated pleas. In return
for the guilty plea and the waiver of the right to a jury trial, the prose-
cutor promises immunity from the imposition of the more serious
charge and its sentence. The judge can not ethically consider his own
conclusions as to the "real offense" when sentencing.'66 Despite the ob-
jection that real offense sentencing is not equitable, there is evidence
that this injustice arises all too frequently. The practice has been de-
scribed as "antithetical to our basic notions of individual worth and fair
play.' 6 7 The real concern is that "[miost courts now operate on a real
offense system; they simply don't admit to it."' 68
The provision in the Florida Sentencing Guidelines should put an
end to this unfair practice. The judge is now forced to articulate and
record the reasons for departure so that reasonable review of the case is
possible. This ensures that the offense at conviction is the one by which
defendants are sentenced, and promotes certainty in sentencing.
this new language. The court approved the changes and commented as to this revision
that it was "revamped to replace the cumbersome language in the [original] rule." 9
FLA. L.W. 169 (May 11, 1984) (No. 19).
162. See supra, note 160.
163. M. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act, 72 J. CRIM L. CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1550 (1981).
164. Id. at 1556.
165. Id. at 1568. Tonry suggests that the practice of "real offense sentencing" is
"institutionalized deceit." Id.
166. Id. at 1568-71.
167. Id. at 1564. "Real offense sentencing undermines the importance of the sub-
stantive criminal law, nullifies the law of evidence, and is irreconcilable with the notion
that punishment can be imposed only in respect to offenses admitted or proven."
168. Id. at 1586.
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III. Constitutionality
It should be noted that Minnesota's guidelines have withstood all
constitutional attacks.""9 Because of the similarities between Minne-
sota's and Florida's guidelines, the Minnesota decisions may serve as
persuasive authority in the initial challenges in Florida. Possible attacks
in Florida may rest on various grounds, including the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment, due process vagueness, equal protection,
or separation of powers. Though it is impossible to foresee the precise
circumstances of a constitutional attack, relevant case law will be ex-
amined in order to predict the outcome of such a challenge.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In a challenge based on the prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the state17 0 and federal 17 1 constitutions, the guidelines
would be sustained, as will be illustrated. First, it is essential to note
that the guidelines do not control capital offenses;1 72 therefore, the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty, as addressed in Gregg v. Georgia,73
will not be an issue. This is evidenced in Rummel v. Estelle, 74 where
the petitioner received a mandatory life sentence pursuant to a Texas
statute requiring such a penalty for all third time felony convictions.
All three convictions were minor property offenses with an aggregate
value of approximately $230. Despite the penalty's apparent harshness,
the statute was upheld. The United States Supreme Court noted that
[b]ecause a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of
imprisonement, no matter how long, our decsions applying the pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases are of
169. State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1983); State v. Olson, 325
N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982); State v. Fields, 311 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 1981).
170. FLA. CONST. art. I, §'17 provides: "[e]xcessive fines, cruel or unusual pun-
ishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable de-
tention of witnesses are forbidden."
171. U.S. CONsT amend. VIII provides: "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
172. FLA STAT. § 921.144 (1982) provides for sentencing proceedings for capital
felonies "to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life im-
prisonment as authorized by § 775.082." This procedure remains unaffected by the
guidelines.
173. 428 U.S. 238 (1976).
174. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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limited assistance in deciding the Constitutionality of the punish-
ment meted out to Rummel.
Outside the context of capital punishment, successful chal-
lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been ex-
ceedingly rare .... I'l
Like the line dividing felony theft from petty larceny, the
point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the
necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist
will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discre-
tion of the punishing jurisdiction.17 1
Gregg also adds weight to the high degree of deference the Court
affords state legislatures in determining sentences. The Florida Su-
preme Court, in Hamilton v. State,17 7 relied in part on Gregg in up-
holding a sentence imposed for sale and possession of cannabis man-
dated by section 893.13 of the Florida Statutes.
[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected
legislature against the Constitutional measure, we presume its va-
lidity. We may not require the legislature to select the least severe
penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhu-
mane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy bur-
den rests on those who would attack the judgment of the represent-
atives of the people.
This is true in part because the Constitutional test is inter-
twined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the leg-
islative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. In
a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to re-
spond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
people. '7
In applying this principle to an attack on a sentence imposed pur-
suant to the Florida guidelines, it is apparent that as long as the actual
sentence received falls within the statutory mandate, it will be upheld.
Indeed, the guidelines are designed to avoid precisely the disproportion-
ate sentences that the cruel and unusual clause proscribes. In Banks v.
State,17 9 the Florida Supreme Court held that a life sentence with a
175. Id. at 272.
176. Id. at 285.
177. 366 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1979).
178. Id. at 11 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-75).
179. 342 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1977) (affirming a conviction for involuntary sexual
[Vol. 8
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minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment prior to parole eligibility
did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. It stated that it had
"no jurisdiction to interfere"18  because the sentence was within the
limits set by the legislature."8
The guidelines' purpose is to limit judicial discretion by "estab-
lish[ing] a uniform set of standards to guide the sentencing judge," 182
thus minimizing unwarranted disparity in sentences. As long as the
sentences are within the guidelines, a cruel and unusual punishment
challenge will undoubtedly fail. However, sentences which are harsher
than the guideline's presumptive range because of "clear and convinc-
ing" 183 reasons, may pose a separate issue of whether the degree of
departure from the guidelines is warranted by the circumstances of the
crime.1 84 If not, the constitutional question of whether the deviation
violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause may be presented,
with less clear-cut results than where the sentence is within the guide-
lines. The outcomes of challenges presenting these questions will de-
pend on individualized analyses of the facts of each case. Because it is
conceivable that a court of appeals could find an abuse of discretion in
the judge's sentence, an extreme departure from the guidelines could
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. However, this finding would
only affect that particular sentence, and not the constitutionality of the
guidelines as a whole.
The weakness of a cruel and unusual punishment attack is further
evidenced by the guidelines' subordination to mandatory sentences. The
guidelines provide that "[f]or those offenses having a mandatory pen-
alty, a scoresheet should be completed and the guideline sentence cal-
culated. If the recomended sentence is less than the mandatory penalty,
the mandatory sentence takes precedence. If the guideline sentence ex-
ceeds the mandatory sentence, the guideline sentence should be
imposed."1 85
Mandatory minimum sentences were upheld in McArthur v.
battery).
180. Id. at 470.
181. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1).
182. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b).
183. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(6) and (d)(11).
184. See supra nn.139-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the permis-
sible extent of departure from guideline sentences in Minnesota. The standard for de-
parture in Florida is discussed supra, notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
185. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(9).
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State18 and State v. Benitez.18 7 In McArthur, the petitioner argued
that the statute, which mandated a twenty-five year sentence before
parole eligibility for first-degree murder constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. He asserted that "it operate[d]without regard to the cir-
cumstances of individual defendants or the crimes for which the defen-
dants have been convicted."'18 8 Regarding the federal Constitution, the
Florida Supreme Court distinguished this case from ones involving the
death sentence, 8 ' relying on Woodson v. North Carolina:9 0 "the pen-
alty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long."''1 In Woodson, the court noted that "the prevailing
practice of individualized sentencing determinations generally reflects
simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative."2
Thus, the penalty passed muster under the federal Constitution.
As to the Florida Constitution, the McArthur court relied on
O'Donnell v. State 93 which upheld a thirty year mandatory sentence
for kidnapping.9 That case reiterated the principle espoused above;
that any sentence within the statutory scheme's limits was not violative
of the Florida Constitution. 95 In State v. Benitez, 98 the Florida Su-
preme Court again rejected the argument that the elimination of judi-
cial discretion in mandatory minimums violates the cruel and unusual
clauses. 97 Relying on McArthur, the court upheld the mandatory
sentences for drug trafficking.'" 8
Since the mandatory minimum sentences are constitutional, the
guidelines' sentences would only be suspect in instances where they ex-
ceed the mandatory minimum and are imposed pursuant to the guide-
lines.199 However, the guidelines allow for more individualized sentenc-
ing than the mandatory minimum sentences. For instance, a
186. 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1977).
187. 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1981).
188. McArthur, 351 So. 2d 972, 975.
189. Id.
190. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
191. Id. at 305 (as cited in McArthur, 351 So. 2d at 975).
192, Id. (Emphasis in original).
193. 326 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975)
194. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (1973).
195. McArthur, 351 So. 2d at 975-76.
196. 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1981).
197. Id. at 518.
198. Id.
199. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(9).
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defendant's record, victim injury, and the defendant's legal status at
time of conviction are all factored into the guideline sentence. Thus,
the guidelines are more proportionate to the seriousness of the crime
and therefore less likely than mandatory sentencing schemes to consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, guideline sentences
exceeding statutory maximums may not be imposed. In the case of
such a conflict the statutory maximum sentence takes precedence. This
further illustrates the intent of the legislature to generally reduce sever-
ity of sentences thus contradicting any cruel and unusual punishment
argument.
B. Due Process Considerations
Perhaps the most likely due process argument would be a vague-
ness challenge. In Benitez, petitioners argued that the definition of a
defendant who is eligible for lenient treatment under Florida Statutes
section 893.135 was impermissibly vague and thus violated the due pro-
cess clauses of the Florida 00 and federal 201 Constitutions.2 0 2 In statutes
proscribing certain activity as criminal, the test for vagueness is "lan-
guage that is definite enough to provide notice of what conduct will
constitute a violation. ' 202 However, the statute challenged in Benitez
and the guidelines do not prohibit behavior as criminal; rather, they
determine penalties for existing substantive crimes. In Benitez, the
court stated that, "[b]eing a description of post-conviction. .. form of
plea bargaining rather than a definition of the crime itself, the phrase
'substantial assistance' can tolerate subjectivity to an extent which nor-
mally would be impermissible for penal statutes." 204 The court held
that the contested phrase was "susceptible of common understanding in
the context of the whole statute," 20 5 and therefore did not violate due
process.20 6
200. FLA. CONST. art. I § 9.
201. U.S. CONsT. amend. V and XIV.
202. 395 So. 2d at 518.
203. State v. Ashcraft, 378 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 1979). The text continues:
"[i]f the language is definite enough, when measured by common understanding and
practice, to apprise ordinary persons [of common intelligence] of what conduct is pro-
scribed, the statute is not vague." Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 448 (1927);
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
204. Benitez, 395 So. 2d at 518 (emphasis in original).
205. Id. at 519.
206. Id.
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It is difficult to predict which, if any, language in the guidelines
may be subject to a vagueness attack. In a Minnesota case, State v.
Givens,207 the defendant attacked the constitutionality of that state's
standards for departure from the guidelines. The Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the guidelines concluding that the vagueness challenge
was "misplaced in this context. '20 8 Relying on reasoning similar to that
enunciated in the cruel and unusual punishment arguments, the court
distinguished the application of a vagueness challenge in death penalty
cases from sentences controlled by the guidelines. Relying on Godfrey
v. Georgia20 9 and Gregg, the court noted that crimes punishable by
death must be defined in a way that "obviates standardless sentencing
discretion. 210 Since Givens was not sentenced to death or subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment, the court refused to extend the doctrine
to his situation: "[t]he application of vagueness argument to more rou-
tine sentencing decisions - those not including the death sentence, is not
contemplated by the Gregg and Godfrey decisions."2 Before conclud-
ing that the vagueness argument was "misplaced,"2 12 however, the
court expressed its support for the guidelines, apparently rejecting the
defendant's challenge on the merits despite its inappropriateness.
Three points must be made before analyzing the constitutional
merit of defendant's claim: (1) the guidelines not only list aggra-
vating factors - such as race, sex, employment - which may not be
used as a basis for a sentencing departure:..(2) the trial court ap-
plied only specified aggravating factors, and (3) this court is in the
process of fleshing out the guidelines in an ongoing series of judi-
cial decisions. Counsel for defendant and the state acknowledged at
oral argument that the guidelines represent a salutory step forward
in controlling sentencing discretion, with an ultimate objective of
achieving greater uniformity in sentencing statewide, consistent
with fitting punishment to the particular nature of the crime
committed." 3
This defense of the guidelines seems to anticipate the possible ex-
207. 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1983).
208. Id. at 190.
209. 446 U.S. 420 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919, reh'g denied 456 U.S.
1001 (1982).
210. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 190, (citing Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428).
211. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 190.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 189.
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pansion of the Godfrey and Gregg decisions. It anticipates an approval
of the degree of definiteness the guidelines possess in case of the need
for such justification in the future. The Florida guidelines may not be
able to meet this type of challenge so ably. They specify no aggravating
or mitigating factors for use in departing from the guidelines. However,
they do prohibit the consideration of race, gender, social and economic
status, 214 or "factors relating to prior arrests without conviction" or
"factors relating to the instant offense for which convictions have not
been obtained. 21 5 General goals in the Statement of Purpose will also
provide guidance to the sentencing judge. 16 Whether these provisions
will be sufficient to save the guidelines from a vagueness attack is un-
certain, but seems probable. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in
Givens, the guidelines represent a "salutory step forward in controlling
judical discretion,' 2 17 and at least assure more definiteness in sentenc-
ing than was guaranteed before the rules' inception. Thus, inasmuch as
the broad discretion allowed in indeterminate sentencing practices of
the past were never held unconstitutionally vague, it is doubtful that
the Florida guidelines will fall to a vagueness challenge.
C. Equal Protection
Another potential ground for attack is the denial of equal protec-
tion of the law in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution and article I section 2 and section 9 of the Florida
Constitution. Because of the high degree of discretion given a state leg-
islature218 in devising statutory categories, this challenge will place a
heavy burden on the petitioner.21
It is difficult to foresee the delineations of the challenged clasgifi-
cation, but several possibilities exist. A broad classification could sim-
ply include all convicted felons subject to sentencing under the guide-
lines. A more narrow class might include all felons convicted and
sentenced pursuant to one of the nine offense categories in the guide-
lines. Whatever the demarcation of the class the test of constitutional-
ity will be whether there exists a "[rlational basis for the classifica-
214. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(1).
215. Id. at (d)(1 1). As discussed supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text, this
provision should end the practice of "real offense sentencing". Supra note 160.
216. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b).
217. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 187.
218. Hamilton v. State, 366 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1979).
219. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1910).
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tion. . .or whether this classification is arbitrary and, therefore,
unconstitutional. 220
In ordinary equal protection challenges where no suspect class or
fundamental right is involved, there is no constitutional mandate that
the law operate without any inequality. "A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is
not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality. ' 221 Therefore, it would not be enough to show that
some offenders are treated somewhat differently than others who,
though apparently similarly situated, somehow were not included in the
class. Furthermore, "[w]hen the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted, must be assumed. 222 Given this test, which is highly deferen-
tial to the legislature, a challenger should be skeptical of the possibility
of success. Surely the state could conceive of some reasonable justifica-
tion for the delineation of the challenged class. Basis for such justifica-
tion could be found in the legislative history of the bill, or in the statis-
tical data gathered by the Sentencing Commission. Unless the
challenger can show that the guidelines classification "does not rest
upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary,"2 23 the challenge
will fail.
In Minnesota, an equal protection challenge of the guidelines
failed even when the defense attempted to bolster its chances of success
by claiming that the guidelines, as applied, were racially discrimina-
tory.224 The defense premised this claim on statistical data showing
that blacks received disparate sentences for the same crimes as
whites.225 If the finding of intentional racial discrimination had been
made, the standard of review would have been elevated from mere ra-
tionality to strict scrutiny.228 The court rejected the contention that ra-
cial discrimination was the reason for defendant's sentence departing
upwardly from the guideline range.
Disparity of sentencing based upon race has no place in our justice
220. Hamilton, 366 So. 2d 8, 10.
221. Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 191.
225. Id.
226. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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system. The guidelines specifically reject race as a sentencing fac-
tor in sentencing decisions. Whatever disparity exists, discrimina-
tion was not the fact [sic] in this case. The absence of bias by the
jury is demonstrated by the verdict acquitting defendant of the
first-degree murder and criminal sexual conduct charges. And
more importantly with regard to sentencing bias, counsel for de-
fense explicitly acknowledged that the trial court was in no way
motivated by racial bias.227
The Florida guidelines also specifically mandate that "[s]entincing
should be neutral with respect to race.""28 Therefore, unless it could be
proved that a particular sentence was imposed solely as a result of ra-
cial discrimination, an attack like the one in Givens would also fail in
Florida.
D. Separation of Powers
Another potential Constitutional argument rests on the Separation
of Powers doctrine. Article II § 3 of the Florida Constitution sets forth
the principles in the following language: "[the powers of the state gov-
ernment shall be divided into legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the other branches unless provided herein."
Article V section 2 provides that "[tihe supreme court shall adopt rules
for the practice and procedure in all courts. . . ." An attack might be
formulated charging that the legislature, in passing section 921.001 of
the Florida Statutes, which proposed the rule implementing the guide-
lines, encroached upon the rule-making authority of the supreme court.
However, the supreme court's adoption of the rules in September, 1983
renders this argument moot.
E. Double Jeopardy
Finally, a challenge based on double jeopardy grounds may be
posed. The state is authorized to appeal from "[a] sentence imposed
outside the guidelines."229 This provision may be grounds for a broad
attack on the constitutionality of this power in that it subjects the de-
fendant twice to jeopardy of life or limb.
227. Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 191.
228. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(1).
229. FLA. STAT. § 924.07 (1983).
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However, this issue was already resolved in United States v.
DiFransesco.2 30 where the United States Supreme Court upheld the
government's right to appeal a sentence. DiFransesco was convicted in
federal district court of racketeering offenses. He appealed his convic-
tion to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the govern-
ment appealed the sentence received under a particular charge.231 The
court of appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions but dismissed the
government's appeal to increase his sentence.232 The court held that "to
subject a defendant to the risk of substitution of a greater sentence,
upon an appeal by the government is to place him a second time 'in
jeopardy of life or limb.' "233 The United States Supreme Court, upon
a grant of petition of certiorari, reversed, explaining that the "Double
Jeopardy Clause is not a complete barrier to an appeal by the prosecu-
tion in a criminal case. '234 Because the appeal did not pose the risk of
a successive prosecution, but merely made possible a greater sentence,
it did not offend double jeopardy principles.23 5 "The Double Jeopardy
Clause does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any
specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will
turn out to be." '23 6
In dicta relevant to the guidelines, the Court noted that "sentenc-
ing is one of the areas of the criminal justice system most in need of
reform" 231 The Court acknowledged that the "basic problem" in the
criminal system is "the unbridled power of sentences to be arbitrary
and discriminatory. '23 8 The Court then concluded that "[a]ppellate re-
view creates a check upon this unlimited power, and should lead to a
greater degree of consistency in sentencing. '23 9 This language implic-
itly lends support to the principles and purposes of the guidelines, and
indicates approval of the type of reform the guidelines attempt to
230. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
231. U.S. v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070,
rev'd, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
232. Id. at 783.
233. Id.
234. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 122 (emphasis in original).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 137.
237. Id. at 142. The Court cites M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, LAW
WITHOUT ORDER (1973) and P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN and D. CURTIS, TOWARD A
JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM (1977).
238. M. FRANKEL, supra note 237, at 49. cited at DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 143.
239. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 143.
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implement.
The Minnesota Guidelines also allow the state to appeal from a
sentence. In State v. Cizl,2 40 the defendant challenged the constitution-
ality of this power, and the court relied on DiFrancesco with virtually
no discussion.241 In Florida, a similar double jeopardy attack will likely
be dismissed on the same grounds.
It is clear that the guidelines will be challenged in various areas of
constitutionality; however, based on this survey of the case law, it may
be concluded that no strong arguments exist. In any event, the perime-
ters of the attacks must be confined to precedent, thus it appears un-
likely for a successfull challenge to be posed.
IV. Conclusion
The guidelines have already caused great controversy in Florida's
judicial and political forums. No one can predict the aggregate impact
of their implementation with great accuracy. The consequences of abol-
ishing early release through parole, the effects on plea negotiation, and
changes the newly proclaimed philosophy of just-deserts will produce
are issues which only time will clarify. The judiciary's implementation
and the Commission's monitoring of the guidelines will determine the
direction of sentencing for the future. The guidelines are not the pan-
acea of the criminal justice system, but merely a modification which
may provide the needed structure to accommodate future
improvements.
Rebecca Jean Spitzmiller
240. 304 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 1981).
241. Id.
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